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ARGUMENT
1. By not requiring compliance with Judicial Rules of Practice & Procedure Rule 18
C (c) the Industrial Commission exceeded its power and authority.
The Industrial Commission as "an administrative agency is a creature of statute, limited
to the power and authority granted to it by the Legislature and may not exercise its sublegislative powers to modify, alter, or enlarge the legislative act which it administers." Simpson
v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 134 Idaho 209, 112, 998 P.2d 1122, 1126 (2000). The Commission
may only exercise that discretion granted by the Legislature. The Legislature's use of the word
"shall" denotes a mandatory, not a discretionary, act. Id. at 134 Idaho 112, 134 P.2d at 1125.
Idaho Code § 72-508 precisely sets forth the authority, and limitations, of the Industrial
Commission. In relevant part it provides:
" ... the commission shall have authority to promulgate and adopt reasonable rules
and regulations for effecting the purpose of this act ... the commission shall have
authority to promulgate and adopt reasonable rules and regulations involving
judicial matters ... Rules and regulations as promulgated and adopted, ifnot
inconsistent with the law, shall be binding in the administration of this law."
Pursuant to its rule-making authority the Commission adopted its Judicial Rules &
Procedures (JRP&P). In doing so it is bound to follow its JRP&P. By adopting JRP&P Rule 18
the Commission is bound to strictly adhere to its requirements when considering lump sum
settlement agreements. The plain language of JRP&P Rule 18 C (c) requires:
C. "Text of the terms of settlement ... shall include: ...
c. Claimant's current medical and employment status." (Appendix A).
Workers compensation benefits can only be awarded as provided under the statutes and
the Commission's rules. See Sadiku v. AAtronics Incorporated, 142 Idaho 410, 411, 128 P.3d
947,948, (2006). The Industrial Commission has no discretion to proceed to approve a proposed
settlement that does not comply with the mandatory requirements of JRP&P Rule 18 C (c). See
1

Henry v. Ysursa, 148 Idaho 913, 916, 231 P.3d 1010, 1013 (2008). Unless the Commission
finds that all of the requisite textual elements of a lump sum settlement agreement exist, it may
not approve the agreement. It is the duty of the Commission to make a full and exhaustive
inquiry when counsel overlook an important and material matter. Piersdorff v. Gray's Auto
Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 450, 74 P.2d 171 (1937). It is error for the Commission to approve an
agreement that clearly fails to contain all of the requisite elements. See Wernecke v. St. Maries
Joint School District #401, 147 Idaho 277, 286, 207 P.3d 1008, 1017 (2009).
The Industrial Commission tacitly acknowledged that the proposed settlement did not
comply with Rule 18 C (c), because its text did not set forth Morris's current medical and
employment status. Nonetheless the Commission asserted that its proceeding to approve the
proposed settlement, without the mandatory requirements, was not a "critical flaw." R. p. 386.
The Commission asserted that its failure to comply with statutory and rule mandatory
requirements was excused because its 'benefits file' contained "medical reports" and
"rehabilitation reports" and that it was "well aware that Claimant suffered a head injury." R. p.
386.

The knowledge that Morris suffered a head injury does not meet the plainly stated

requirement that the text of a proposed settlement agreement "shall" state a claimant's current
medical and employment status.
The Commission asserted that the purpose of Rule 18 is to "ensure the Commission has
information on which a determination can be made." R. P. 386. While one purpose of the
mandatory requirements is to provide the Commission with information, it is submitted that
another, equally important, purpose is that the injured worker needs to be informed of what the
Commission is being told about his or her current medical and employment status when it
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considers whether or not the proposed settlement is in his or her best interest. In his December
28,2009, letter to the Commission, Morris's attorney represented:
"The Claimant has been released to return to work without significant physical
work restrictions. He is exploring vocational options and anticipates utilizing
proceeds from the LSS resolution to assist with retraining costs." R. p. 280.
Morris's medical records, and the report of the vocational expert hired to assist the
attorney, are dramatically irreconcilable with his attorney's representations to the Commission.
Morris's treating physician'S medical records, prior to his attorney's letter to the
Commission, that:
1. August 2, 2009, his treating physician, Dr. Stanek-He is still not back to work. He

needs Botulinum Toxin to reduce neck and shoulder spasms, to have his vision
checked, psychological counseling to address his chronic pain issues, depression,
anxiety, and anger, and vocational rehabilitation. R. p. 375-376.
2. November 13, 2009, his treating physician, Dr. Stanek-He needs to stay with his
family and be observed over the next three days. He is not to drive for the next three
days. He is to follow-up for repeat Botulinum Toxin injections on the 1ih. R. p. 377.
3. November 14, 2009, his treating physician, Dr. Stanek-Wrote to Morris's attorney
that "The simple fact remains that Ben is still not back to work. My intention was for
Ben to be involved in a multidisciplinary program to address his headaches, neck
pain, TMJ, de conditioning, assistance with diabetic management, psychological
issues including the anger he is experiencing, and nutrition/weight loss ... At this point
I think that it would be in Ben's best interest to move forward. Ben should work
closely with a vocational rehabilitation counselor to determine suitable work
situations." R. p. 105.
4. November 25, 2009, his treating physician, Dr. Stanek-He has unresolved TMJ;
post concussive syndrome; depression with anxiety; diabetes; chronic neck pain and
spasms; chronic headaches; nightmares; and dizziness. He is to be continued on
Lexapro and Prevacid and to follow up in one month. R. p. 378.
The vocational expert's report is dated December 15,2009. R. pp. 200-203. It
documented that Morris:

1. Has an ongoing traumatic brain injury with no resolve to the claimant's need for
psychological and vocational assistance.
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2. Has been found eligible for Social Security Disability benefits. (See also award, R. p.
69)
3. Is eligible for rehabilitation services from the Idaho Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation.
4. Cannot return to his time of injury employment nor can he return to employment
within his previous heavy-duty employment.
5. Requires a non-stressful sheltered work environment.
6. Needs a sheltered employment placement with ajob coach.
7. Needs a work hardening program.
Morris's medical records subsequent to the attorney's letter, and before the Commission
approved the LSSA, are consistent with the previous records. On January 15, 2010, his treating
physician, Dr. Stanek, referred Morris to the SLRI Pain Clinic for a comprehensive program to
facilitate helping him return to work. R. p. 236.

Without the mandatory current medical and employment status information being set
forth in the text of the proposed settlement, the Commission did not have the required current
medical and employment information. The Commission was not compelled by any statutory or
rule imposed time constraint to approve the LSSA without the required current information. The
Commission had no discretion to disregard the required compliance with JRP&P Rule 18 C (c).!
Piersdorff v. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 450, 74 P.2d 171 (1937). In absence of full
compliance with Rule 18 C (c), the Commission lacked the authority to approve the proposed
settlement agreement. The Commission's order is void. See Wernecke at 147 Idaho 286, 207
P.3d at 1017.

1 As noted in the Opening Brief, the Commission refused to provide a copy of the "synopsis of the
case" prepared for it by a 'Benefits Analyst' at the Commission asserting that it represented
"privileged work product." . AR, p. 10. However, a portion of the Benefits Analyst's review process
is contained in record provided by the Commission at R. pp. 306-307. It appears from these e-mail
communications with Liberty that the only review undertaken by the Analyst occurred on January
13 th to 14th, 2010, to verify the correct amount of temporary total disability benefits that had been
previously paid to Morris. His review revealed that Liberty overpaid this benefit, for the period of 18-08 to 12-1-08, in the sum of$416.06, and Liberty waived the 'overpayment'.
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ARGUMENT
2. The representations of Appellant Morris's attorney to the Industrial Commission
constitute the degree of fraud necessary to set aside the Commission's approval
of the LSSA.
Idaho Code § 72-718 provides:
"A decision of the commission, in the absence of fraud, shall be final and conclusive
To all matters adjudicated by the commission upon filing the decision ... "
The Commission, citing the Court's decision in Harmon v. Lute's Const. Co., Inc., 112
Idaho 291, 732 P.2d 260 (1986), held that only allegations and proof of fraud on the part of
employer's surety in procuring the agreement is sufficient and thus "there is no evidence before
us on which we could legitimately rely to support a finding of fraud." R. p. 387 (emphasis in
Commission's decision); p. 287.
It is submitted that the Harmon decision is limited to its facts wherein fraud was alleged

based upon allegations that the surety's adjuster mislead the claimant. The adoption of such a
narrow limitation of fraud is unwarranted. The Commission has previously recognized and held
that if the intent of the legislature was to narrowly define words in a statute it will do so within
the plain language ofthe statute. See The Industrial Commission v. Oasis Legal Finance, L.L.C.,
I.C. 2007-028248, pp. 18-26 (January 13, 2012). Appendix B.

In Oasis, the Commission

addressed the question of whether or not the statutory prohibition of an assignment of a claim for
compensation set forth in Idaho Code § 72-802 also applied to an 'assignment of compensation.'
The Commission, in a decision that it acknowledged had the effect of eliminating perhaps the
only means by which an injured worker "would be able to keep a roof over his head, or put food
on the table" during protracted workers' compensation proceedings, held that Idaho Code § 72-

802 should not be narrowly limited. It stated:
"had it been the intent of the legislature to narrowly define the word 'claim' to
5

only mean the assignment of claimant's chose in action, not to include the
proceeds payable as a consequence of the successful prosecution of that claim,
then the amendment would have been stated differently, or incorporated elsewhere
in the statute." Id. p. 23.
Likewise, had the legislature intended to limit "fraud" to actions perpetrated by the
surety, it would have done so with plain wording so stating.
The Commission's proceedings are governed by its own set of procedures regarding
pleadings and it is not bound to follow the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. However the
Commission, as support for its narrow interpretation of "fraud" limiting it to conduct by the
surety, cited LR.C.P. Rule 60 (b) (3), which provides for relief from a judgment for fraud of an
adverse party. R. p. 388. Rule 60 (b) (3) is not applicable to an interpretation of the Workers'
Compensation Act, especially where the plain wording of the statute enacted by the legislature
contains no such limitation.
The Court has consistently held that the Workers' Compensation Act is to be liberally
construed in favor of the employee in order to serve the humane purpose for which it was
promulgated. Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School District #401, 147 Idaho 277, 282, 207 P.3d
1008, 1013 (2009). Construing the phrase "in the absence of fraud" to only mean fraud on the
perpetrated by the surety does not serve the purpose of Idaho's Workers' Compensation Act to
keep an injured worker and the worker's family from becoming destitute because the
breadwinner has been injured and cannot work. Williams v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 151 51, 260
P.3d 1186, 1193 (2011). In order to serve the humane purpose of the Act, it does not matter
from where the fraud emanated. If limiting the construction of "in the absence of fraud" was the
intent of the legislature, it would have so stated in the statute.
Undersigned counsel has not located an opinion of this Court addressing the nature of the
conduct necessary to establish the nature of fraud by a client's counsel that is sufficient to hold
6

that a judgment or settlement contract voidable. Research into the decisions of other jurisdictions
revealed that conduct "where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client's
interest to the other side" is conduct sufficiently fraudulent to set aside a judgment. See United
States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 66, 25 L.Ed 93 (1878); Alexander v. Alexander, 229 S.W.2d
234,236-239, (Ark. 1950). These decisions discuss that, in cases where an attorney sells out his
client's interests and there has not been "a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case," such
conduct is sufficient to "annul the former judgment or decree, and open the case for a new and
fair hearing." United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. at 66; Alexander v. Alexander, 229
S.W.2d at 236.
Counsel has not been able to locate any elaboration on what constitutes conduct
consisting of corruptly selling out his client's interests to the other side. Corruption is defined in

Blacks Law Dictionary, Revised 4th Edition, as being the act of a fiduciary who wrongfully uses
his station to procure some benefit for himself contrary to his duty and the rights of others. See
Appendix C. The facts in the record support a fmding that this occurred in this matter.
Prior to sending his letter in support of his attorney fees to the Commission, Morris's
attorney was aware that Morris had qualified for Social Security Disability Benefits. R. p. 240.
U.S. Social Security Administration's requirements for a person to receive Disability Benefits
are strict.
"Social Security pays benefits to people who cannot work because they have a medical
condition that is expected to last at least one year or result in death ... While some
programs give money to people with partial disability or short-term disability,
Social Security does not." (Appendix D).
Contrary to the attorney's representations to the Commission that Morris was recovered
to the extent that he was able to return to work, Morris's counsel was aware that Morris was
receiving Social Security Disability Benefits and that he was receiving them because he was not
7

able to work. The attorney's affidavit, filed in support of his objection to Morris's attempt to
have the LSSA set aside, stated that in drafting the LSSA's language he had language inserted to
protect the Disability Benefits that Morris was receiving from SoCial Security. He stated:
"To help protect against the social security offset, I asked Liberty to include the language
in the agreement averaging Claimant's recovery over his lifespan." R. p. 172, ~ 17.
The LSSA did not inform the Commission, and the Commission did not ask, why the
lump sum was apportioned to represent weekly prorated payments. If the Claimant was able to to
return to work as he represented to the Commission the obvious question would be, "Why is that
necessary?" The attorney's letter to the Commission also did not provide any explanation for the
lump sum being prorated and representing weekly payments of $15.73. Neither the LSSA, or the
attorney's representations to the Commission, made any mention of the fact that the Social
Security Administration had determined, just two months earlier, that Morris was incapable of
working and therefore entitled to Disability Benefits. Indeed, such a representation would have
been totally inconsistent with the attorney's affirmative representation to the Commission that
Morris could return to work without significant physical restrictions.
In the attorney's argument against Morris's request that the Commission set aside the
LSSA, he offered no explanation, and the Commission did not require him to provide any
explanation, for the inconsistency between his representation that Morris was physically able to
return to work and the fact that he was receiving Social Security Disability benefits because he
could not work, in need of treatment at a pain clinic to facilitate his return to work, and in need
of a sheltered workplace with a job coach. In the memorandum in support of the motion to set
aside the LSSA Morris argued to the Commission that, at best, this could only be viewed as
constructive fraud on the claimant and the Commission. R. p. 369.
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Constructive fraud comprises all acts, omissions and concealment involving a breach of
legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence resulting in damage to another. Constructive fraud
usually arises from a breach of duty where a relation of trust and confidence exists. Bethalamy v.
Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 62-62, 415 P. 2d 698, 705-706, (1966).

Morris and his attorney's

relationship was a fiduciary one. Mitchell v. Barendregt, 120 Idaho 837, 844, 820 P.2d 707, 714
(Idaho App. 1991). When there is a duty to speak because of a fiduciary relationship, a failure to
do so is a specie of fraud for which relief may be afforded. McGhee v. McGhee, 82 Idaho 367,
353 P.2d 760 (1960); See Mitchell v. Barendregt, 120 Idaho 837, 820 P.2d 707 (Idaho App.
1991). Morris's attorney had the duty to inform him that not only did he not include the required
textual information regarding his current medical and employment status in the LSSA, but also
the duty to inform him that he was going to represent to the Commission that he was recovered
to the extent that he was able to return to work. The attorney did not inform Morris that he had to
make such a representation and that, without such a representation the Commission would in all
likelihood not approve such a settlement and his attorney fees. The attorney did not advise
Morris that, without such a representation, the Commission would be compelled to conduct an
inquiry into the merits of his claim in order to "properly judge whether an injured worker is
surrendering a strong claim for too small a settlement." Wernecke v. st. Maries Joint School
District #401, supra., quoting Commissioner Maynard, at note 9.
The LSSA, and the attorneys letter in support of his attorney fees, represented to the
Commission that Morris's attorney would receive fees and costs of $15,023.00 to be deducted
from the settlement proceeds. R. p. 280. They also represent that Morris would receive the net
sum of $31,623.03. Morris did not receive that sum. Morris's attorney deducted $1,000.00 from

the 'net sum' as reimbursement for an advance that he made to Morris, before the LSSA and the
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attorney's letter were submitted, on December 21, 2009. The Commission was not informed
about it. R. p. 119. Morris's attorney also deducted another $2,000.00 from the 'net sum', after
the LSSA and attorney's letter were submitted, as reimbursement for a second advance that he
made to Morris on January 14, 2010. R. p. 120. The actual net sum that Morris received from
the settlement proceeds was $27,453.53. The relevant point is not that the attorney advanced
Morris money. Morris no doubt needed it to pay for basic living expenses and to get his car
repaired. R. p. 175. It is respectfully submitted that the relevant point is that Morris's attorney
had requested Liberty to "expedite preparation of the LSS documentation," because Morris was
"in need of these settlement funds as soon as possible," and in less than one month's time, he
needed $3,000.00 to live on. R. p. 117.
Under the Commission's Workers' Compensation Benefits Table, if he was totally and
permanently disabled, Morris would be entitled to receive a minimum of $289.35 per
week/$1,157.40 per month. See Appendix E. The 'net sum' Morris would receive under the
LSSA was roughly the equivalent of two (2) years workers' compensation benefits despite the
fact that he was by all contemporaneous indications, in the medical records, in the vocational
expert's report, and in Social Security Administration's determination, unable to work at all. At
the time that the settlement was approved Morris was thirty-three (33) years old and had a
reasonable life expectancy under Social Security Administration's Actuarial Life Table of fortyfour (44) years. See Appendix F. If Morris was found to be totally and permanently disabled, he
would be entitled to receive an $1,157.40 per month for his lifetime and that monthly amount
would increase on a yearly basis depending upon the state average weekly wage.

It is the Commission's responsibility to ensure that a proposed settlement is in the best
interest of the injured worker. Idaho Code § 72-404.
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"This is a responsibility that the

Commission must scrupulously honor." Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint Sch. Dist. #401, 147 Idaho
277, 286, 207 P .3d 1008, 1017 (2009). While the Commission had general knowledge that
Morris suffered a "head injury" and that ''the LSSA left medical benefits open" it did not have
the necessary, and required, information regarding his current medical and employment status.
Without this information the Commission did not have sufficient information to consider the
LSSA. R. p. 386. If the Commission had been provided, and required that it be provided the
mandatory information in the text of the proposed settlement agreement, it would have realized
that Morris was not able to return to work, that he needed treatment at a pain clinic to facilitate
his possible return to work, and that he needed two advances from his attorney to live on within
the one month period of time immediately prior to its consideration of the LSSA, the
Commission, in exercising its responsibility to scrupulously ensure that the settlement was in
Morris's best interest, would have had to reject the notion that the $15.73 per week/$62.92 per
month allocation, of the one lump sum he would receive, would be sufficient to keep Morris and
his family from becoming destitute.
It is respectfully submitted that the attorney's action in affirmatively misrepresenting that

Morris was physically able to return to work, when he did not include such a representation in
the terms of the LSSA or provide Morris with a copy of, or inform Morris of, his representations
to the Commission, constitutes the degree of corrupt selling out of his client's interest sufficient
to hold the Commission's approval ofthe LSSA is void.
ARGUMENT
3. The Commission erred in failing to provide Morris a hearing on the issue of fraud.
The Commission held that "there is no evidence before us on which we could
legitimately rely to support a finding of fraud" because it erred in limiting "fraud" to acts
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perpetrated by the surety and as a result it sub silentio denied Morris's request for a hearing on
the issue. R. p. 287. The Commission's pleading procedures are set forth in Rule 3 of the Judicial
Rules of Practice & Procedure. Appendix G. They are similar to other administrative agency
rules in that regard. Rule 3 does not require fraud to be pled with particularity.

The

Commission's rules do not establish any standard necessary to be set forth, by affidavit or
testimony, to assert a claim of fraud for the purpose of obtaining a full hearing. See Staff of the
Idaho Real Estate Commission v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 635, 22 P.3d 105, 110. (2001). In
the two reported decisions where this Court had occasion to address appeals from the
Commission that involved allegations of fraud the decisions reflect that the Commission held a
hearing to fully vet the fraud allegations. See Harmon v. Lutes Construction Company, Inc., 112
Idaho 291, 732 P. 2d 260 (1986); Sadiku v. AAtronics Incorporated, 142 Idaho 410, 128 P.3d
947 (2006).
At hearing Morris would have the burden of proving all the elements of constructive
fraud by clear and convincing evidence. Harmon v. Lute's Construction Company, Inc., 112
Idaho 291, 293, 732 P.2d 260, 263 (1986). However, at the motion stage seeking to obtain a
hearing, Morris was not required to prove each element by clear and convincing evidence. Staff
of the Idaho Real Estate Commission v. Norling, 135 Idaho 630, 635, 22 P.3d 105, 110 (2001).
The Commission further attempted to support its denial of a hearing by stating that
Morris "is free to seek recourse as it may be available to him in some other venue [civil suit], but
the Industrial Commission does not have jurisdiction to address those issues." R. p. 388. The
Commission's refusal to provide a timely hearing and requiring him to pursue his remedy
through civil litigation is contrary the legislative intent that the workers' compensation law
provide sure and certain relief for injured workers and their families. Idaho State Insurance Fund
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v. Van Tine, 132 Idaho 902, 911, 980 P.2d 566, 574 (1999). Morris is not seeking damages
against his attorney in this proceeding. If, after a hearing, the Commission determines that
Morris has presented clear and convincing evidence that the attorney's actions constitute
constructive fraud, he will not have suffered substantial damage that would require him to
consider proceeding through a complicated, expensive, and time consuming a civil lawsuit. The
legislature intended that the workers' compensation act "give injured workmen a speedy,
summary, and simple remedy for the recovery of compensation in all cases coming within its
provisions." Pierstorff v. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 450, 74 P.2d 171 (1937). Morris is
asking the Commission to review and clarify his rights under the Workers' Compensation Act
and it is in his best interest that he not be sUbjected to civil litigation to resolve his workers'
compensation rights. See Williams v. Blue Cross ofIdaho, 151 Idaho 51, 54, 55, 260 P.3d 1186,
1189, 1191 (2011). The legislature intended that the workers' compensation act "give injured
workmen a speedy, summary, and simple remedy for the recovery of compensation in all cases
coming within its provisions." Pierstorff v. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 450, 74 P.2d 171
(1937). The Commission's determination, requiring Morris to pursue a civil suit to seek redress,
in a matter that is fully capable of being resolved through the Commission's hearing process,
does not conform with the legislature's intent that an injured worker's remedy be speedy,
summary in nature, and simple.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Industrial Commission should be held void and this matter
remanded to the Industrial Commission due to the Commission's failure to comply with JRP&P
Rule 18 C (c). In the alternative, the judgment of the Industrial Commission should be held void

and this matter remanded for a hearing on the issue of fraud.
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Respectfully submitted this 7th day of November, 2012.

~U£bC

Starr Kelso, Attorney for Appellant Morris

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE:
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief were mailed on the i h day of
November, 2012, by regular U.S. Mail with postage prepaid thereon, to the attorney for
Respondent as follows:
Kent W. Day
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, Idaho 83707-6358

~uJ2wStarr Kelso
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APPENDIX

APPENDIX

RULE 18.

LUMW SUM SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS

A.

Service, Form.

Documents necessary to finalize settlement under this rule shall be filed and a copy
served on the other parties. The text of a settlement agreement shall be on 8.5" X 11" paper and
shall identity the attorney or party that prepared it.

B.

Standard of Review.

Prior to approving a lump sum settlement, the Commission will review a proposed lump
sum settlement to determine whether such settlement is in the best interests of all parties.
Supporting documents shall be complete, accurate, legible, and arranged in chronological order
with the earliest date proceeding to the most recent date without duplicate submissions.

C.

Requirements.

To ensure the Commission has information on which a determination can be made, the
Commission requires the parties to submit the following information and serve a copy on each of
the parties:
1.

Text of the terms of settlement, which shall include:
a.

The parties' names,

b.

Industrial Commission claim number(s),

c.

Claimant's current medical and employment status,

d.

A list of all medical providers paid, grouped within categories which are
"physician," "hospital," "therapy," "mileage," "miscellaneous,"

e.

An itemized summary of benefits paid and those to be paid,

f.

Outstanding and unpaid medical expenses, if any,

g.

Method of calculating benefits and supporting data, including key medical
records,

h.

Signature of the claimant and the signatures of all other parties, or the
authorized agents of the other parties, to the agreement,
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D.

i.

An itemization of any and all fees and costs charged by claimant's counsel
prior to the submission of the agreement and an itemization of fees and
costs to be deducted from the lump sum payment or payments, and

j.

A copy of the attorney fee agreement between claimant and counsel for
claimant.

2.

Attorney fee letters as set forth in IDAPA 17.02.05.281.

3.

An affirmative statement that the agreement is in the best interests of the parties,
pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-404.

Effect of Submissiou and Hearings.

The submission of a proposed lump sum settlement or agreement shall not be considered
a motion. If the Commission declines to approve a proposed lump sum settlement agreement,
the Commission may request additional relevant information, or on its own motion or on the
motion of a party to the agreement schedule a hearing limited to the issue of whether the lump
sum settlement and discharge of one or more defendants is for the best interest of all parties.
There is no appeal from the Commission's decision.

E.

Format.

The information required under Section C of this rule shall be submitted in a format
substantially similar to the form provided in Appendix 6A and B.

COMMENT: Paragraph D reflects the administrative process in reviewing proposed lump sum
settlement agreements. If not initially approved, the parties may still submit additional iriformation for
consideration by the Commission. Also, an administrative hearing is available to the parties for
presentation ofrelevant information for the Commission to consider in reviewing the lump sum settlement
proposal.
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INTRODUCTION

By Order dated January 26,2011, Oasis Legal Finance, L.L.C., ("Oasis") was ordered to
show cause why certain legal funding contracts between Oasis, and two Idaho Workers'
Compensation Claimants, Bret Tylinski and Jonathan Gould, should not be found to be invalid
under the Idaho Workers' Compensation laws.

Subsequent thereto, the Commission was

presented with a proposed lump sum settlement in the case of Terry Denny v. URS, for review
and approval.

That agreement anticipated a payment from the proceeds of the lump sum

settlement to Oasis, in satisfaction of another legal funding contract. The Industrial Commission
consolidated the three matters for the purposes of a show cause proceeding held on November 3,
2011 at Boise, Idaho. Present for Oasis was R. Daniel Bowen, Esq., of Boise, Idaho, and
William M. McErlean, Esq., of Chicago, Illinois. At hearing, the testimony of Lisa Foreman,
General Counsel for Oasis, was taken. Oasis offered Exhibits 1 -- 15, which were admitted into

evidence. The prehearing deposition of James Arnold was also admitted into evidence. In
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addition to the foregoing, the Commission takes judicial notice of its own legal files on each of
the three matters consolidated for purposes ofthe show cause proceeding.
Oasis submitted a post-hearing brief and the matter came under advisement on December
5,2011. Being fully apprised in the law and the premises, the Commission issues the following
decision regarding the applicability of the provisions of I.C. § 72-802 to the Oasis purchase
agreements.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Gould v. Ormond Builders, Inc.
1.

Jonathan Gould suffered a work related injury on or about May 22, 2008. His

timely claim was accepted by Surety, and workers' compensation benefits were paid to
Claimant, or on his behalf, for the effects of the injury. The parties disputed the extent and
degree of both Claimant's impairment and disability in excess of impairment. These and other
disputes were

resolve~

via a lump sum settlement approved by the Industrial Commission on or

about September 2, 2010. Pursuant to the terms of that agreement, it was anticipated that
Claimant would receive $32,391.50 lump sum consideration.

The Commission approved

attorney's fees in amount of $8,097.88, and costs in the amount of$l,OOO.OO. Per the terms of
the agreement, it was anticipated that Claimant would net $23,293.62 after the payment of
attorney's fees and costs.

On or about September 9, 20 I 0, the Industrial Commission was

contacted by Claimant who had questions about additional funds withheld from the settlement.
An inquiry from the Industrial Commission revealed that following approval of the lump sum

settlement agreement, Surety contacted the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare to ascertain
whether or not a child support withholding order was in effect. Upon being advised of the
settlement, the Department of Health and Welfare immediately issued a withholding order and
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delivered the same to Surety.

Surety deducted the sum of $11,646.81 from the settlement

amount for payment to the Department of Health and Welfare in satisfaction of the withholding
order. Surety then forwarded a check in the amount of $20,744.69, ($32,391.50 - $11,646.81) to
Claimant's counsel.
2.

The Commission also learned that an additional payment had been made directly

from counsel's client trust account to an entity identified as Oasis Legal Finance, L.L.C., in the
amount of $7,461.00.

Claimant's counsel explained that this payment was made to satisfy

Claimant's obligation under the terms of an agreement he had previously made with Oasis. After
deductions for costs and attorney's fees approved by the Commission, the valid child support
order, and the payment to Oasis, Claimant netted $4,185.81 from the original settlement of
$32,391.50.
3.

At the request of the Commission, counsel provided the Commission with a copy

oran Oasis "Purchase Agreement" executed by Claimant on June 16,2009, pursuant to the terms
of which he received the immediate payment of $3,650.00.

The agreement describes the

transaction as follows:
Seller [Gould] sells all of Seller's interest in and to the Purchased Interest to
Purchaser [Oasis], and Purchaser purchases the Purchased Interest from Seller on
the terms and conditions provided in this Purchase Agreement. The purchase of
the Purchased Interest shall entitle Purchaser to receive the Oasis Ownership
Amount ... As consideration for the sale of the Purchased Interest, Purchasers
shall pay the Purchase Price to Seller... "
Oasis Ex. 8, p. 55.
4.

The terms "Purchased Interest" and "Oasis Ownership Amount," are defined as

follows:
"Oasis Ownership Amount" is the amount Purchaser is to be paid out of the

Proceeds and as detennilwd ~s of the date Purchaser receives payment based on
the Payment Schedule on Page 1 of this Purchase Agreement.
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"Purchased Interest" means the right to receive a portion of the Proceeds equal to
the Oasis Ownership Amount on the further terms and conditions provided for in
this Purchase Agreement.

§§ 1.2 and 1.4, Oasis Ex. 8, p. 56.
Therefore, the interest that Oasis purchased for the sum of $3,650.00 is its right to
recover from the proceeds of the workers' compensation case the "Oasis Ownership Amount,"
an amount which equals the original purchase price plus an additional amount that increases with
the passage of time. Per the Gould agreement, the Oasis ownership amount payable to Oasis at
any particular time is described in the payment schedule:
Oasis Ownership Amount
Oasis Ownership Amount: (payoff Amount)
Payment Schedule
June 16,2009 to December 15,2009
$5,475.00
$6,022.50
December 16, 2009 to June 15,2010
$8,212.50
June 16,2010 to September 15, 2010
$9,125.00
September 16, 2010 to December 15,
2010
. $10,057.50
December 16, 2010 to June 15,2011
$11,862.50
June 16,2011 to December 15,2011
December 16,2011 and thereafter
$12,775.00
Fees Due at Repayment:
$20.00
Case Servicing Fee every 6 months
$20.00
Subsequent Case Review for each additional funding
Facsimile and Photocopying Costs per Funding
$ 9.00
Oasis Ex. 8, p. 55
5.

The purchase agreement further specifies that the Oasis ownership amount shall

be determined as of the date Oasis receives payment in full from or on behalf of seller.
Importantly, the agreement specifies that seller is not entitled to receive any proceeds from the
workers' compensation claimant until Oasis has received the Oasis ownership amount. (See,
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Oasis Ex. 8, p. 58). To this end, Oasis required both Gould, and his attorney, to execute an
"irrevocable letter of direction" contemporaneous with the execution of the purchase agreement.
Pursuant to the terms of irrevocable letter of direction, both Claimant and his attorney
acknowledge and agree that the Oasis ownership amount is to be paid from the proceeds of any
settlement of the workers' compensation claim before any funds are released to Claimant. The
letter further anticipates that any settlement monies paid by Employer/Surety will be paid by
check to Claimant's attorney, and that all disbursements of funds will be made through the
attorney's client trust account. (See, Oasis Ex. 10, p. 64).
6.

The purchase agreement also makes it clear that in the event Gould takes nothing

on his underlying worker's compensation claim, he has no obligation to pay the Oasis ownership
amount.
7.

Notwithstanding that the payment schedule for the Oasis ownership amount bears

some similarities to the repayment of the principal amount of a loan, plus interest thereon, the
agreement goes to some length to dispel any notion that the transaction should be construed as a
loan versus a purchase and sale:
Risk of Loss; No Loan Transaction. The purchase of the Purchased Interest and
the other transactions contemplated by this Purchase Agreement involve a
substantial economic risk and a bona fide risk of loss to Purchaser. The Oasis
Ownership Amount has been negotiated to account for such risk. The sale of the
Purchased Interest is an .absolute sale and not a loan secured by a collateral
assignment ofthe Purchased Interest.

Treatment of Transaction. Seller agrees to treat and report this sale and purchase
of the Purchased Interest as a sale transaction and not as a loan for all purposes
(including tax purposes).
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Treatment in Bankruptcy. If Seller commences or has commenced against it any
case or other proceeding pursuant to any bankruptcy, insolvency or similar law
prior to payment of the full Oasis Ownership Amount to Purchaser, Seller shall
cause the Purchased Interest to be described as an asset of Purchaser (and not as a
debt obligation of Seller) in any oral or written communications, including,
without limitation, any schedule or other document filed in connection with such
case or proceeding.
§§ 3.1, 5.1, 5.2, Oasis Ex. 8, p. 57.
8.

As of the date of settlement of the underlying workers' compensation claim, the

payment schedule specifies that Oasis was entitled to collect the sum of $8,212.50. However,
through the efforts of Claimant's counsel, and with the agreement of Oasis, that sum was
reduced to $7,461.00.
9.

On learning of the existence of the purchase agreement, and in view of the direct

payment to Oasis from counsel's client trust account in the amount of $7,461.00 from the
proceeds of the lump sum settlement, the Commission filed its timely notice of reconsideration
of the lump sum settlement agreement pursuant to the provisions of I.C. § 72-718. Under that
section, the Commission is empowered to reconsider its decision to approve the lump sum
settlement agreement on its own initiative. Reconsideration of the approval of the settlement
was thought necessary because of concerns over the legillity of the payment to Oasis under the
provisions of I.C. § 72-802.
10.

Following notice to the parties, the Commission held a hearing in Idaho Falls on

November 30,2010, for the purpose of obtaining additional information concerning the nature of
Claimant's agreement with Oasis, Mr. Wetzel's involvement in the transaction, and the manner
of the disbursement of funds. A copy of the transcript of those proceedings has been offered into
evidence as Oasis Exhibit 2.
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11.

Many of the Commission's concerns over the legality of the $7,461.00 payment

could not be adequately addressed by the parties in attendance at the November 30, 2010
hearing. In furtherance of its duties to administer the Idaho Workers' Compensation laws, and
pursuant to I.C. § 72-714(3), the Commission is empowered to make such inquiries and
investigations as may be necessary to assure the proper administration of the Workers'
Compensation laws of this state. The Commission ordered Oasis to appear and show cause why
the Commission should not enter an order finding that the payment made from counsel's client
trust account in satisfaction of the June 16, 2009 purchase agreement is illegal under the
Workers' Compensation laws of this state, and further requiring Oasis to return the sum of
$7,461.00 to Claimant.
Tylinski v. Guerdon Enterprises
12.

On or about August 10,2007, Bret Tylinski suffered an accident/injury arising out

of and in the course of his employment. The claim was accepted by the Workers' Compensation
Surety, and benefits were paid to Tylinksi, or on his behalf.
13.

As did Gould, Tylinksi sold the right to a portion of the proceeds of his workers'

compensation settlement to Oasis. Tylinki's case, however, involves two purchase agreements.
The first agreement was made on or about December 20, 2008, pursuant to the terms of which
Tylinksi agreed to sell his interest in a portion of the proceeds of any subsequent recovery on his
workers' compensation claim to Oasis for the sum of $1 ,050.00. The Oasis ownership amounts
and the payment schedule differed from the payment schedule at issue in Gould, because of the
lower purchase price.

In connection with the December 20, 2008 purchase agreement, the

following payment schedule applies:
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Oasis Ownership Amount
Payment Schedule
December 19, 2008 to June 18,2009
June 19,2009 to December 18, 2009
December 19,2009 to March 18,2010
March 19,2010 to June 18,2010
June 19,2010 to December 18, 2010
December 19,2010 to June 18,2011
June 19,2011 and thereafter

Oasis Ownership Amount (payoff Amount)
$1,575.00
$1,732.50
$2,362.50
$2,625.00
$2,887.50
$3,412.50
$3,675.00

Oasis Ex. 3, p 36.
14.

On or about January 5, 2009, Tylinksi entered into a second purchase agreement

with Oasis, under the terms of which Claimant received $550.00 consideration from Oasis in
exchange for Oasis' purchase of an interest in the proceeds of any subsequent workers'
compensation settlement.

The payment schedule for the Oasis ownership amount for this

purchase is set forth in the agreement as follows:
Oasis Ownership Amount
PaYment Schedule
December 31, 2008 to June 29, 2009
June 30, 2009 to December 30,2009
December 31,2009 to March 30,2010
March 31,2010 to June 29, 2010
June 30, 2010 to December 30,2010
December 31,2010 to June 29,2011
June 30, 2011 and thereafter

Oasis Ownership Amount (Payoff Amount)
$825.00
$907.50
$1,237.50
$1,375.00
$1,512.50
$1,787.50
$1,925.00

Oasis Ex. 6, p. 46.
15.

The purchase agreements at issue in the Tylinski matter are substantially similar

to the agreement at issue in Gould. However, the Gould agreement contains the following
provision:
No Assignment. The parties agree and affirm that this contract does not represent
an assignment of workers compensation benefits as defined under state law.
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See, § 6.6, Oasis Ex. 8, p. 59.

The Tylinski agreements are bereft of this "no assignment" language.
16.

As did Gould, Tylinski and his attorney executed two irrevocable letters of

direction.
17.

On or about November 5, 2010, Tylinski submitted a proposed lump sum

settlement agreement for review and approval by the Industrial Commission, under the terms of
which Tylinski would receive $18,000.00 in settlement of his claims.

After deduction of

attorney's fees and costs of suit, Claimant was expected to net $11,226.00.
18.

Although not disclosed in the lump sum settlement agreement, the Memorandum

of Attorney's Fees and Costs submitted by Claimant's counsel reveals that counsel expected to
pay, from the proceeds of the lump sum settlement, the sum of $4,945.00 to Oasis. On or about
December 9, 2010, the Commission entered its order approving the lump sum settlement in part,
but requiring Claimant's counsel to retain the sum of $5,220.00 from the proceeds of the
settlement, representing the amount that would be payable to Oasis ifpaid subsequent to January
6, 2011, but prior to June 19, 2011. Counsel was ordered to hold this sum in trust, pending
further order from the Commission on the validity ofthe contract between Tylinski and Oasis.
Terry Denny v. URS

19.

At all times relevant hereto, Terry Denny was employed by DRS. On June 29 or

June 30, 2009, Denny suffered an accident/injury arising out of and in the course of his
employment with Employer.

The claim was accepted by Employer/Surety, and workers'

compensation benefits were paid to Denny or on his behalf.
20.

On or about September 9, 2010, Denny entered into a purchase agreement with

Oasis, under the terms of which he was paid the sum of $5,150.00 in consideration of Oasis'
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receipt of an interest in the proceeds of any future recovery made by Denny in connection with
his worker's compensation claim. The purchase agreement specifies the following payment
schedule of the Oasis ownership amount:
Oasis Ownership Amount
Payment Schedule
Oasis Ownership Amount (payoff Amount)
September 9,2010 to March 8,2011
$7,725.00
March 9, 2011 to September 8, 2011
$8,497.50
$11,587.50
September 9,2011 to December 8,2011
December 9, 2011 to March 8, 2012
$12,875.00
March 9, 2012 to September 8,2012
$14,162.50
September 9, 2012 to March 8, 2013
$16,737.50
March 9, 2013 and thereafter
$18,025.00
Fees Due at Payment
Case Servicing Fee every 6 months
$30
Subsequent Case Review for each additional funding
$20
Facsimile and Photocopying Costs per Funding
$25
21.

The terms of the Denny purchase agreement are substantially similar to those at

issue in both the Gould and TyIinski transactions.

However, the Denny "no assignment"

language differs slightly from the language used in the Gould contract. In this regard, the Denny
agreement specifies:
No Assignment of Workers Compensation Benefits. The Parties agree and
affirm that this contract does not represent an assignment as defined under state
law.
§ 5.8, Denny Purchase Agreement.
22.

On or about April 8, 2011, Denny and Employer/Surety presented a proposed

lump sum settlement to the Commission for review and approval, under the terms of which
Claimant would receive $20,000.00 new money. The explanatory attorney fee letter submitted
by Fred Lewis, Claimant's counsel, reflects that as of April 18, 2011, the Oasis ownership
amount was approximately $7,800.00. By Order filed April 25, 2011, the Industrial Commission
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approved the proposed lump sum settlement agreement, except that the Commission ordered
counsel to hold the sum of $7,724.25, representing the Oasis ownership amount, in trust, pending
the Commission's determination of the validity of the purchase agreement between Denny and
Oasis.
23.

Following the issuance of the Industrial Commission's January 26,2011 Order to

Show Cause in the Gould matter, the Commission entered its May 18, 2011 Order consolidating
the Tylinski, Gould and Denny matters for purposes of the Order to Show Cause hearing.
24.

Preparatory to hearing, the hearing testimony of James Arnold was taken by way

of prehearing deposition.
25.

James Arnold is an attorney practicing in eastern Idaho. His practice involves

primarily the representation of injured workers before the Idaho Industrial Commission.
26.

He testified that approximately five years ago he became aware of the existence

of Oasis, and other legal financing companies whose business model involved the "loan of
monies to injured workers against the anticipated recovery in a personal injury or workers'
compensation action." He testified that he was initially very leery of these companies since the
money "loaned" to the injured worker was very expensive. However, he testified that as his
experience with Oasis increased, he found the company easy to work with, and willing to
negotiate what the company would accept in satisfaction of the Oasis ownership amount.

Mr.

Arnold testified that because of the expensive nature of the Oasis money, he attempts to persuade
clients to utilize Oasis' services only as a last resort, i.e. after his clients have exhausted more
conventional, and cheaper, loan opportunities.
27.

Mr. Arnold testified that he has no business relationship with Oasis, and that he

has n~ver receiv~d a client referral from Oasis.
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28.

Mr. Arnold testified that Oasis does vet the cases of injured workers who offer to

sell an interest in the proceeds of their workers' compensation claim to Oasis. He testified that
Oasis is ordinarily reluctant to provide money in cases where liability is disputed. However, he
noted that in the cases where this has become an issue, he has persuaded Oasis to complete the
transaction because of his representations about the strength of a particular case. He stated that
as he developed a relationship with Oasis, the vetting of cases with Oasis became easier as the
company developed confidence in Mr. Arnold's ability to evaluate cases.
29.

Finally, Mr. Arnold testified that in spite of the expensive nature of the Oasis

money, the company fills a real need in the Idaho Workers' Compensation system.

Where

$3,000 or $5,000 means the difference between being evicted from one's apartment, or missing a
mortgage payment, during the pendency of a workers' compensation claim, it is worth obtaining
money from Oasis, when all other resources have been exhausted.
30.

Lisa Foreman is General Counsel for Oasis. She is licensed to practice law in the

state ofIIIinois, and has been employed by Oasis since September 2005. Her job responsibilities
include oversight of litigation in which the company is involved. As well, she assists with the
company's regulatory initiatives nationwide. She testified that the business model utilized to
purchase interests in the proceeds of workers' compensation claims is used in 45 states inclusive
of Idaho. In five states, Oasis has either chosen not to do business, or is prohibited from
foHowing this business model by applicable law.
31.

Ms. Foreman testified that the Oasis purchase agreement was drafted so as not to

conflict with non-assignment statutes similar to I.C. § 72-802. Specifically, she testified that
although the purchase agreement may involve an "assignment," the assignment anticipated by
the agreement is not the prohibited assignment

of a workers' compensation "claim." Rather, per
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Ms. Foreman, the purchase agreement anticipates the assignment of a contingent interest in the
proceeds of a workers' compensation settlement. If the purchase agreement was intended to
effectuate the assignment of the injured worker's claim, then one would expect Oasis to be the
only entity which could prosecute the claim following the assignment. Clearly, the purchase
agreement does not anticipate that anyone but claimant can prosecute the claim. The only
assignment which Ms. Foreman would concede might be anticipated by the language of the
purchase agreement is the assignment of a contingent interest in the proceeds of the workers'
compensation settlement. Per Oasis, when it comes to applying the language of I.C. § 72-802,
there is a real and significant difference between the assignment of a workers' compensation
claim, and the assignment of the proceeds of a workers' compensation claim. The former is
prohibited, the latter is not.
32.

Although the purchase agreement bears some similarities to a loan transaction,

. neither would Ms. Foreman concede that the agreement should be treated as a loan. In the main,
her argument is that a true loan creates an obligation for the repayment of a debt certain, whereas
the Oasis purchase agreement creates an obligation only upon the occurrence of certain
contingencies, including, inter alia, claimant's receipt of an award or settlement of some type
following the prosecution or settlement of his claim
33.

For the same reason, Ms. Foreman argued that neither does the Oasis purchase

agreement create a creditor/debtor relationship.

Importantly, however, Ms. Foreman

acknowledged that at some point in the course of an Oasis transaction with an injured worker,
the relationship might mature into one of a creditor and a debtor. If a settlement is obtained, and
if there is money remaining in the attorney's client trust account following the payment of
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medical biils and attorney's fees, then Oasis may become a creditor with respect to the proceeds
of settlement owed to Oasis per the purchase agreement. (See, Hr. Tr., 16118-18114).
34.

Confirming Mr. Arnold's testimony, Ms. Foreman acknowledged that the Oasis

money is "expensive," but that Oasis purchase agreements fill a need that goes largely unfilled
among a sizeable minority of the popUlation of workers' compensation claimants; without Oasis
type purchase agreements, such claimants would be unable to bridge the financial abyss that lies
between the curtailment of workers' compensation benefits and the resolution of the workers'
compensation claim.

Ms. Foreman explained that Oasis is not as draconian as might be

suggested by the repayment schedules described above. Oasis frequently agrees to a reduction of
the repayment amount depending on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.

35.

During the pendency of the Commission's consideration of this matter, Oasis has

agreed to freeze the payment schedule for each of the three cases at issue in this proceeding.
ISSUES
The following matters are at issue:

1.

Whether there is an actual controversy which warrants the Commission's review

of the application ofI.C. § 72-802 to the Oasis contracts;
2.

Whether the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to consider the legality of the

Oasis purchase agreements under I.C. § 72-802;
3.

Whether the Oasis purchase agreements violated the provision of I.C. § 72-802:
a.

Whether the Oasis purchase agreement is a prohibited assignment of a

workers' compensation claim;
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b.

Whether Oasis is a "creditor," and if so, whether the settlement amounts

paid following the approval of the lump sum settlement agreements at issue
constitute "compensation" not subject to the claim of a creditor.

DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS

I.
1.

As Oasis has noted, the record is bereft of evidence that any of the Claimants in

this consolidated proceeding take the position that Oasis is not entitled to recover the Oasis
ownership amount following the settlement of their respective workers' compensation claims.
Indeed, although it was Mr. Gould's inquiry concerning the propriety of the payment of the
Oasis ownership amount from his attorney's client trust account that alerted the Commission to
these practices and initiated the instant inquiry, Mr. Gould testified that although he and his
attorney considered whether to dispute the Oasis claim to a portion of the proceeds of settlement,
he ultimately decided that the indebtedness he had voluntarily incurred should be paid. Mr.
Gould testified that even if the settlement proceeds in question had been paid directly to him, and
contrary to the irrevocable letter of direction, he would nevertheless pay Oasis what he owed.
Although it can be supposed that one or more of the Claimants in these matters might find a use
for the monies that are in dispute, none of the Claimants have voiced opposition to the
agreements they executed. However, we do not feel that in the absence of a challenge to the
provisions of the purchase agreement by one or more of the Claimants, we are prohibited from
considering whether or not the Oasis purchase agreements are invalid under I.C. § 72-802.
2.

First, these matters arise under the statutory responsibilities created by I.C. § 72-

404. In full, that section provides:

Lump sum payments. Whenever the commission detennines that it is for the best
interest of all parties, the liability of the employer for compensation may, on
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application to the commission by any party interested, be discharged in whole or
in part by the payment of one or more lump sums to be determined, with the
approval of the commission.
3.

Therefore, it matters not that the parties have provisionally settled their disputes

unless the Commission, too, can be satisfied that the settlements are in the best interest of the
parties. The fact that none of the Claimants in these proceedings have seen fit to challenge the
propriety of the Oasis purchase agreements informs, but does not govern, the Commission's
inquiry into whether or not these settlements are in the best interest of the parties. Indeed, were
we to adopt Oasis' reasoning, the Commission would never be able to consider whether or not a
proposed settlement is in the best interest of the parties since the parties, having provisionally
settled their disputes, can no longer be said to have matters in controversy.
4.

In summary, I.C. § 72-404 vests the Commission with the responsibility to

ascertain whether the proposed lump sum settlements are in the best interest of the parties. Part
and parcel of that determination is the Commission's assessment of whether or not the provisions
of I.C. § 72-802 bar Oasis from access to the proceeds of settlement. In each of the three cases
referenced above, the Commission still has before it for consideration whether the lump sum
settlement agreement should be approved. Therefore, notwithstanding that the parties are in
apparent agreement concerning the disposition of the proceeds of settlement, the Commission's
inquiries concerning the proposed settlement are not only appropriate, but required.

II.
5.

Oasis also challenges the Industrial Commission's jurisdiction to review the

propriety of the purchase agreements between Oasis and the Claimants, and each of them. Under
I.C. § 72-707, the Commission has jurisdiction to consider all questions arising under the

Workers' Compensation laws of this state. See, Williams v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 2011 Idaho
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1261 260 P.3d 1186 (2011); Van Tine v. Idaho State Insurance Fund, 126 Idaho 688, 889 P.2d
717 (1994); Owsley v. Idaho Industrial Commission, 141 Idaho 129, 106 P.3d 455 (2005). Per
I.C. § 72-404, the Commission has the responsibility to approve lump sum settlement agreements
and, in so doing, must determine that the settlement is in the best interest of the parties. It
necessarily follows that the Commission has jurisdiction to clarify claimant's rights under the
lump sum settlement agreement that is presented to the Commission for approval. See, Williams
V.

Blue Cross of Idaho, supra. It is also worth noting that the statutory provision which may

invalidate the Oasis purchase agreement is a statute specific to the Workers' Compensation laws,
and the Commission clearly has jurisdiction to consider whether one of the provisions of the
statutory scheme it administers affects Oasis' claim to the proceeds of a workers' compensation
settlement.
6.

For these reasons, the Commission rejects Oasis' assertion that it does not have

jurisdiction over the subject matter of this dispute. The questions before the Commission are
clearly questions arising under the Workers' Compensation laws of this state.

ID.
I.C. § 72-802 provides:
Compensation not assignable -- Exempt from execution. No claims for compensation
under this law, including compensation payable to a resident of this state under the
worker's compensation laws of any other state, shall be assignable, and all compensation
and claims therefor shall be exempt from aU claims of creditors, except the restrictions
under this section shall not apply to enforcement of an order of any court for the support
of any person by execution, garnishment or wage withholding under chapter 12, title 7,
Idaho Code.
7.

This statute, and similar provisions found under the laws of other states, appears,

at first blush, to bar two types of actions. First, the statute prohibits the assignment of claims.
S~cond,

tile statute prohibits the claims of creditors against compensation and claims therefor.
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With respect to the statutory prohibition against the assignment of claims, Oasis acknowledges
that an assignment took place. However, it argues that the assignment was not a prohibited
assignment of a claim. Rather, the assignment made by each ofthe three Claimants to Oasis is of
a non-prohibited type; the assignment made by the Claimants was of a contingent right to the
proceeds of a workers' compensation settlement. Oasis argues that had the Idaho legislature
intended to prohibit this type of assignment, the statute would have so stated. In other words, the
legislature would have prohibited not only the assignment of "claims for compensation," but also
the assignment of "compensation." This argument, according to Oasis, finds its best support in
the fact that the prohibition applicable to creditors applies not only to "claims for compensation,"
but to "compensation" as well.

The argument is that the legislature clearly appreciated a

distinction between compensation and claims therefor in connection with the prohibition against
the claims of creditors, and it must therefore be presumed that it understood the significance of
prohibiting the assignment of only "claims for compensation," instead of "claims for
compensation" and "compensation."

This argument has found good traction in several

jurisdictions.
8.

In Kentucky Employers' Mutual Insurance v. Novation Capital, LLC, 2011 W.L.

832316 (Ky. Ct. App. February 25, 2011) claimant entered into a settlement of his workers'
compensation case under the terms of which he would receive $400 per week for 70 weeks, one
lump sum payment of $150,000 and $486 for 520 weeks. Thereafter, claimant entered into an
agreement with Novation Capital, pursuant to the terms of which claimant assigned his right to
the proceeds of his structured settlement in exchange for a lump sum of$112,952.
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The workers' compensation surety objected to the agreement, arguing that it violated the
anti-assignment provisions of the Kentucky Workers' Compensation laws, which provided in
pertinent part:
[nJo claim for compensation under this chapter shall be assignable, except court
or administratively ordered child support pursuant to KRS 403.212. All
compensation and claims therefor, except child support obligations, shall be
exempt from all claims of creditors.
Noting,the general rule that courts are required to construe words and phrases according to their
usual, ordinary and every day meaning, the court rejected the surety's challenge, reasoning that
by its express language the statute only prohibited the assignment of "claims," not the
assignment of "compensation."

Supporting this conclusion was the court's analysis of the

broader language prohibiting the claims of creditors. In this regard, the court stated:
Significantly, the second sentence of the statute distinguishes claims and
compensation. As pointed out by the circuit court in its thoughtful analysis, had
the General Assembly intended to prohibit the assignment of an award or
settlement, it could have simply included language expressing such intent. Based
on similar facts, the Kentucky Supreme Court reached the same result.
In Newberg, the injured employee and his employer entered into a settlement
agreement that provided for reimbursement by the Special Fund for amounts
determined to be the responsibility of the Fund but paid by the employer pursuant
to the terms of the agreement.
9.

In Rapid Settlements LTD's Application for Approval of Structured Settlement

Payment Rights v. Symetra Assigned Benefits Service Company, 133 Wash. Ct. App. 350, 136
P.3d 765 (2006), North Carolina resident Hargette was the beneficiary of a structured settlement
in a North Carolina workers' compensation case.

To fund the settlement payments,

employer/surety purchased an annuity from Symetra Life Insurance Company. The settlement
agreement and the annuity contract prohibited Hargette from assigning his right to payment.
Time

passed, and

at so.rp.e point, Hargette arranged to give
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up

his right to some of his future

periodic payments to Rapid Settlements LTD, in exchange for a lump sum payment. As required
by Washington law, Rapid notified Symetra and sought court approval over Symetra's objection.
In addition to arguing that the annuity contract itself prohibited the assignment of the
right to periodic payments, Symetra argued that applicable North Carolina Workers'
Compensation law also prohibited the assignment by Hargette of his right to receive periodic
payments under the annuity contract. In particular, North Carolina law provided:
No claim for compensation under this Article shall be assignable, and all
compensation and claims therefor shall be exempt from all claims of creditors and
from taxes.
To this argument, Rapid responded that by its specific language, the North Carolina Act
bars assignment only of "claims for compensation," not the right to payments achieved by the
settlement of such claims.
10.

The Washington court ruled that the phrase "all compensation and claims

therefor" clearly expressed an intention on the part of the North Carolina legislature to
distinguish between claims for compensation and compensation itself. Had North Carolina
intended to bar assignment of compensation itself, the statute would have been worded
differently. For example, North Carolina could have stated the statutory prohibition against
assignments as follows, had it wished to prohibit both the assignment of claims and
compensation therefor:
No compensation and no claims for compensation under this article shall be
assignable, and all compensation and claims therefor shall be exempt from all
claims of creditors and from taxes.
11.

The statutory language at issue in both cases discussed above is similar, but not

identical, to the Idaho statutory scheme. In connection with the issue currently before the

Industrial Commission, the language of the statute prohibiting the assignment of claims bears
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closer examination. Following the 2009 amendment to I.C. § 72-802, the section of the statute
dealing with the prohibited assignments reads as follows:
Compensation not assignable - exempt from execution. No claims for
compensation under this law, including compensation payable to a resident of this
state under the workers' compensation laws of any other state shall be assignable

12.

It is immediately apparent that the non-assignment provisions of LC. § 72-802,

though similar to the statutes at issue in the Kentucky and Washington cases discussed above,
contains some significant differences. Against the suggestion that Idaho, too, is among those
jurisdictions which distinguish between the assignment of claims and the assignment of
compensation, there are two components of the statutory language which suggest otherwise.
First, the title of the statute plainly states that "compensation [is] not assignable." Anticipating
the need to reconcile this language with the interpretation it promotes, Oasis argues that the title
of the statute must be ignored where it conflicts with the unambiguous direction of the body of
the statute. In other words, Oasis argues that the title of the statute cannot be used to create an
ambiguity where none otherwise exists. Cited in support of this proposition are Kelso and Irwin,
PA. v. State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 997 P.2d 591 (2000); and State v. Peterson, 141

Idaho 473, 111 P.3d 158 (2004). In Peterson, the court ruled that although the title is a part of
the statute, it may not be used as a means of creating an ambiguity when the body of the act itself
is clear. We believe that Oasis has correctly apprehended Idaho's adoption ofthis general rule of
statutory construction. However, as developed below, we also believe that the body of the
statute is not without ambiguity, thus making it appropriate to consider the title of the statute,
along with the language of the statute, itself, to infer the legislature'S intentions.
13.

As noted, the statute ostensibly prohibits only the assignment of claims, while

protecting both claims and compensation from the claims of creditors. However, it is important
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to recognize that in the section of the statute prohibiting the assignment of claims, the 2009
amendment to the statute specifies that this prohibition against the assignment of claims includes
"compensation payable" to an Idaho resident under the workers' compensation laws of another
state. Had it been the intent of the legislature to narrowly define the word "claim" to mean only
the assignment of claimant's chose in action, not to include the proceeds payable as a
consequence of the successful prosecution of that claim, then the amendment would have been
stated differently, or incorporated elsewhere in the statute.

To be consistent with the

construction urged upon the Commission by Oasis, the statute could have been written as
follows:
No claims for compensation under this law, including claims for compensation
payable to a resident of this state under the workers' compensation laws of any
other state . . .
As well, to give effect to the construction urged by Oasis, the 2009 amendment could have been
inserted at a different place in the statute:
No claims for compensation under this law shall be assignable, and all
compensation and claims therefor, including compensation payable to a resident
of this state under the workers' compensation laws of any other state, shall be
exempt from all claims of creditors ...
14.

Instead, the amendment makes it clear that "claims," which term includes

compensation payable to an Idaho claimant under the workers' compensation laws of some other
state, are not assignable. This structure strongly suggests that the legislature's use of the term
"claim" was intended to include not only a prohibition against the assignment of the cause of
action, but also a prohibition against the assignment of the proceeds payable to an injured worker
as the result of his or her workers' compensation claim.
15.

To the extent that the non-assignment language of the statute is deemed

ambiguous, we think that the title of the statute, which is not utilized in this context to create an
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ambiguity, actually lends further support to the proposition that what the legislature intended was
to prohibit both the assignment of claims, and proceeds thereof.
16.

This reading ofI.C. § 72-802 finds support in the recent case of Williams v. Blue

Cross of Idaho, supra. Discussing in the legislature's purpose in adopting I.C. § 72-802, the

court observed:

The purpose behind exempting workers' compensation proceeds from the claims of
creditors is not to allow the injured worker to recover twice for his or her medical
expenses but, rather, to protect the worker and his or her family from the financial
difficulties associated with the worker's injury.
"Workers' compensation awards are intended not to make the worker
rich, but to keep an injured worker and the worker's family from
becoming destitute because the breadwinner has been injured and
cannot work. In order to protect this award and further this policy,
workers' compensation statutes typically provide that these awards
cannot be attached by creditors. Moreover, they provide that the
worker cannot voluntarily assign the proceeds, primarily in order to
ensure that injured workers who may have a valid claim but have not
yet received the first payments and are desperate for cash do not sell
their rights at fire sale prices." Validity, construction, and effect of
statutory exemptions of proceeds of workers' compensation awards,
48 A.L.R.5th 473 (1997).
Williams v. Blue Cross ofIdaho, 260 P.3d at 1193.

17.

The Court paraphrased the I.C. § 72-802 prohibitions as follows:

The plain language of I.C. § 72-802 prohibits (1) a workers' compensation
claimant from assigning workers' compensation proceeds to a third party, and (2)
a creditor, other than one seeking to recover child support, from asserting a claim
against workers' compensation proceeds paid to a claimant.
Although the Court was well aware of the specific language used by the legislature in crafting
the provisions of the statute, it nevertheless concluded that the prohibition against assignment
extends to the assignment of workers' compensation proceeds, exactly what has been attempted
in these cases under the Oasis purchase agreement. We also think it important that the Williams
Court made a point of emphasizing that I.C. § 72-802 is intended to protect the injured worker
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against exactly the type of practice that is at issue in this matter. By its citation to the ALR 5

Article quoted above, the Court has recognized that one of the purposes of I.C. § 72-802 is to
ensure that injured workers with valid, yet unrecognized, claims, will not sell their rights at "fire
sale prices" in order to keep body and soul together during the pendency of their claim. The
Court's explanation of the legislative purpose underline I.C. § 72-802 precisely anticipates the
facts of these cases.
18.

The assignment at issue was an assignment of an expectancy, or a contingent right

to receive workers' compensation benefits. Certainly, at the time of the assignment, these were
rights that had not yet ripened to a certainty. However, the assignment of a conditional right to
something is well recognized under Idaho law.

See, Simplot v. Western Heritage Insurance

Company, 132 Idaho 582, 977 P.2d 196 (1999); Fuller v. Callister, 150 Idaho 848, 252 P.3d
1266 (2011); Capps v. FIA Card Services, 149 Idaho 737, 240 P.3d 583 (2010). We see nothing
in the facts of this case that makes the Oasis purchase of a contingent right to the proceeds of a
workers' compensation claim anything less than an "assignment" of an expectancy, under Idaho
law.
19.

Weare not unmindful of the fact that the prosecution of a contested workers'

compensation claim is a sometimes protracted affair. We are aware of the fact that it is not
unusual for a typical workers' compensation claimant to be deemed a poor credit risk, unable to
access any of the more traditional, and cheaper, forms of credit available in the community. We
recognize that whatever else might be said about the cost associated with obtaining money from
a legal financing company such as Oasis, these companies fill a need as lenders oflast resort who
can provide an injured worker with the means to obtain what is absolutely necessary to keep a

roof over his head, or put food on the table, until he recognizes something from his workers'
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compensation claim. We are loathe to deny the injured workers of this state this last choice,
especially when we have nothing to offer Claimant during the pendency of a litigated claim.
However, we believe that the Oasis business model, notwithstanding that it is styled as a
purchase/sale, nevertheless relies upon an assignment of a contingent right to workers'
compensation benefits. We find, therefore, that these assignments are invalid under LC. § 72802.
20.

Because we have found that a prohibited assignment of Claimants' rights to

workers' compensation benefits took place, we do not reach the question of whether or not Oasis
is also a creditor who is prohibited from making a claim against compensation, or claims
therefor.
21.

Although we have found that the Oasis agreements rely upon a prohibited

assignment, we also recognize that our ruling has the potential to create a windfall to Gould,
Tylinksi and Denny. To prevent unjust enrichment to these Claimants, we believe that where a
Claimant's recovery in an underlying workers' compensation case is otherwise sufficient to
implicate the requirement to pay the Oasis ownership amount, the equitable solution is to require
the injured worker to reimburse Oasis in the amount of the purchase price originally paid by
Oasis to the injured worker at the outset ofthe relationship.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

1.

The purchase agreement and associated documents executed by Tylinski, Gould

and Denny create assignments of an expectancy in the proceeds of their workers' compensation
claims, which is prohibited under the provisions ofLC. § 72-802;
However, to prevent unjust enrichment to Tylinksi, Gould and Denny, and to return the

parties, as ne~rly

~$ possible, to the posHions they were
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in prior to

the prohibited assignments,

Tylinksi, Gould and Denny shall each reimburse Oasis in the amount of the purchase price paid
by Oasis under the terms of the purchase agreements at issue;
2.

On the Commission's Notice of Reconsideration of the lump sum settlement at

issue in Gould v. Ormond Builders, Oasis is directed to repay to Claimant the sum of $3,811.00,
representing the difference between the negotiated settlement of the Oasis ownership amount
($7,461.00) and the purchase price originally paid by Oasis ($3,650.00). The subject lump sum
settlement agreement is, in all other respects, approved, per the Commission's Order of
September 2, 2010;
3.

In the matter of Tylinski v. Guerdon Enterprises, LLC, and pursuant to the

December 9, 2010 Order approving, in part, the lump sum agreement, counsel for Claimant is
hereby ordered to release to Claimant the sum of $3,620, representing the difference between the
amount retained by Counsel in his client trust account at the direction of the Commission
($5,220.00) and the purchase price paid by Oasis, ($1,600.00). Counsel is directed to release to
Oasis the sum of$I,600.00;
4.

In the matter of Denny v. URS, and pursuant to the Commission's Order

approving, in part, Stipulation and Agreement for Lump Sum Settlement filed April 25, 2011,
counsel for Claimant is hereby directed to release to Claimant the sum of $2,574.25, representing
the difference between the amount retained by Counsel in his client trust account at the direction
of the Commission ($7,724.25) and the purchase price paid by Oasis ($5,150.00). Counsel is
directed to release the sum of$5,150.00 to Oasis.
5.

This order is final and conclusive as to all matters decided herein pursuant to I.C.

§ 72-718.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
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CO:&REGIDOR
CORREGIDOR. In Spanish law. A . magistrate
Who took cognizance of . various ' misdemeanors,
and of civil matters. 2 White, New Recop. 53.
CORREI. Lat. In the civil law. . Co-stipulators;
.

joint stipulators.

· COR.REI CREDENDi. . In the civil ' and Scotch
law. Joint. creditors; creditors in solido . . Path.
ObI. pt. 2, c. 4, art. 3, .§ 11. . '
CORREI DE:BENDI.In Scotch law. Two or more
persons bound a~ principal debtors to another.
.Ersk.Inst. 3! 3, 74.
.
CORRELATIVE. Having a mutual or reciprocal
relation, in such sense tha t the existence of one
necessarily implies the existence of 'the other.
Father . and son; are correlative terms. Claim
and duty are correlative terms . .
CORRESPONDENCE. Interchange of written
· communications. . The letters' written 'by a person.
· and the answers written by the one to whom they
are addressed.
.
CORROBORATE. .' Tostrengthen;tQ add weight
.or credibility to a · thing by additional and con·
firming .facts or evidence. Lassiteo v. Seaboard
Air Line Ry. Co., 171 N .C. 283, 88 S.E. 335,337;
Bradley v. State, 19 Ala.App. 578, 99 So. 321, 322;
Holines 'v. State, 70 Tex.Cr.R. 423, · 157 S;W. 487,
'493; State v. Fullerton Lumber Co.; 35 S.D. 410,
152 N.W, 708, 715; Kincaid v: State, 131 Tex.Cr.
· R 101, 97 S.W.2d175, 177.
.

"'),

CORRUP:r' PRACTICES ACT. The Act .of June
25, .1910, c. 392, 36 Stat. 822, which, like the. Eng~
lish act of 1883 and supplements, dealt with '(cor·
rupt .and illegal practices" in connection with'
elections, and which was repealed by the ."Federal .
Corrupt Practices' Act" 'of ·F eb. 28, .1925, c. '368,
Title III, 2 U.S.C.A. § 241 et seq.

· CO~ROBOR~TINGEvmENCE. . Evidence su~
plementary .· to . that already given and tending to
strengthen or confirm. it; · additional evidence of
a. different character to the same' point. In re
· .Cardoner's Estate, 27 N.M. 105,196 P. 327, 328;
.Statev. Smith, 75 Mont. 22,241 P. 522, 523 ; Pepple
.v. Follette, 74 Cal.A.pp, 178, 240 P; 502, 519; Rad· ·
· cliffe v.Chavez, 15 N.M. 258, 110 p, 699,701.

CORRUPTLY. .When used in .a· statute, this term
generally ilpports a wrongful ' design to ~ acquire
some pecuniary or other advantage. ".' Grebe v.
State, 112 Neb. 715, 201N.W. 143,' 144; Bosselinan
v. U. S., C.<;:.A.N.Y.; .239 F. 82, 86; Statev:. Ship·
man, 202 N.C. 518, 163' $,E.657. '. ' '. .

Spoifed;tainted;

vitiated;

· CORRUPT INTENT.

:A-, ;'~oi-~Pt .intent," as

CORSELET; . Ancient armor which ' covered the
body.
. CORSE-PRESENT.' In '~ldEng1ish law; "'A mor,

de·

tuary, thus termed · because; ' when a mortuary
became due on the death ,of a ,:inan, the' best or

an

second-best 'beast was, according to custom, offered
or presented to the priest, and carried with
co,·p~e. In . Wales a co~se.~r~se~~ .was due u~~m

prayed; debased. Webster.

CORTIS• .A
CORTULARIUl\I, or CORTi\RIm
ords, A yard adjoining a countr:
CORvEE. .:in Fre~ch law. Gratu
acted from.the villages orcommun
for repairing roads, . constructinli
State v. Covington, 125 N.C. 641, 3. CORvEESEIGNEuRIALE. Servi(
of the manor, Guyot, .Rep.,Univ.; ~

,An act done with' an intent to give :some advan·
tage inconsistent with offiCial·duty and .the rights
of others. Johnson v. U. S.,C.C.A.Alaska, 260 F.
783,786.
. ..
.
. .... ~

CORRUPTION OF llLOOD. In English law.
The consequence of attainder., l;>eing that the 'at·
tainted person could neither inherit lands or other
hereditaments from his ancestor, nor retain those
he already had, nor' transmit· them by descent. to
any heir,. because his blood was considered in law
lo:be ·corrupted.Avery v; Everett, 110 N.X.317, 18
N:E: 148, 1 L.R.~. 264; 1 Steph.Comm. 446. This
was abolished by St. 3 & 4 Wm. .IV. c. 106, ' arid
33 & 34 Viet. c. 23, and is unknown in Anierica,
Const.U.S. art. 3, § 3.
.' .

CORRUPT.

. CORTEX. . :
of 'a nything:

CORRuPTION. IilegalitY; a vicious and fraudil·
lent intention to evade the · pr6hibitions of the
law; something ' against or: forbidden by law;
moral turpitUde' or . exactly opposite6f honesty
involving intentional dIsregard of law from 1m·
proper motives.. State v. Barnett, 60 Okl.Cr.. 355,
69 P.2d77, 87. · · ·
.
.

The act ot an. officIal .'o r · fiducIary person who unlawfulIy_
and wrongfully uses:. his station ' or 'character' to procnre
"orne benefit ~or ' himself. or for another person, contrary to
duty ' and the rIghts of others. . U. S. V. Johnson, C.C;Ga.,
26 F. 682'; Worsham v. Murchison, 66 Ga. 719; U. S. v.
Edwards, C,C.Ala., 43 F. 67. . . . .
... .

tlie

u

CORTES. ')
the ' parliam

CORRUPTIO ' OPTIMI EST PEssrnA; '. C~rrup.
tion of the best is worst .. Jacobs v. Beecham; '221
U.S. 263, 31 S.Ct. 555, 55 L.Ed. 729.

. The '. expression "corroboratlng . cIrcumstances" . clearly
does not mean facts which, Independent of a confession,
will, Warrant a' convictIon; for then · the verdict would
stand .·not on the confessIon, .but upon ·those Independent
· Circumstances. To' corroborate Is to strengthen, to corillrm.. by ·additlonal security; to add .strength. .The testimony of
a witness Is sald to be corroborated when !tIs shown to .
.correspond ·wlth the representatIon of some' other wItness,
or to compor:t wIth some facts otherwIse known or establlsheu. Corroborating circumstances, then, used In referenceto a confessIon. are such as serve to .strengthen It, to
render It more p~obable; such; In short, as may serv.e to
, impress a . jury .wIth a belle! In Its truth_ State v. Gulld
10 N.J.Law, 163, 1~ AID.Dec. 404.
'
. ,

CORR.OBORATIVE EVIDENCE. See .Corroborat·
ing Evlden~e.
.

which . the . ;
· preca#on.. j
nounced 'im
it was consi
Eng.Law,3(
345; Spelmc

2d423, 425, which only requires intent t6.. receIve
more than the law pennits for . forbearanceiJ!
money, but does not require that ·taker knows, that .
he is violating usury law. .
' "::.'.
,

COSA JUZGADA. In Spanish la'
matter adjudged, (res judicata.)
Recop. b. 3', tit. 8,> note ..

.

.

'V' :.:

7'

.

.

.

COSASCOMtrNES. In Spanish la'
r~sporiding . to the ' res communes,
law, and descriptive oLsuch thin:
to the equal and com,mon enjoyrr
sons and not to be reduced to pri,
such as . the 'air, the sea, ' and the w .
streams. Hall, Mex.Lawi 447; I
69. Cal. 255, 10 P. 707. .
.
COSBERING..

See Coshering.

COSDuNA. In feudal law. . , A ell!
COSEN,COZEN. In old English
"A.cosening knave." 3 Le·o n. 171.
COSENAGE. (Also spelled "Cosi
age.") . In old. English law. A w
the' heir where the tresaiZ, i ..·e., tt
'besail, or· great-grandfather, was
in fee at . his death, and a strangE
. the land apd abated. Fitzh.Nat.B
·.: Comm. *186.
Kindred; cousinship; , relatior
Stat. 4 Hen. m. cap. 8; -3 Bla.C
Litt. 160a: .
COSENING. In bId English la,
mentioned in the old books, wher

done deceitfully, whether belongi
or not, which could, not be· prop
any special name. The same as
of the civil law, Cowell; West.Syr
ment, § ,68; . Blount; 4. Bla.COJ;nm.
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Disability is something most people do not like to think about But the chances that you will become
disabled probably are greater than you realize. Studies show that a 20-year-old worker has a 3 in 10
chance of becoming disabled before reaching full retirement age.

Audio MP3

This booklet provides basic Information on Social Security disability benefits and is not intended to answer
all questions. For specific information about your situation, you should talk with a Social Security
representative.

Related Information

Alternative media

More publications
We pay disability benefits through two programs: the Social Security disability Insurance program and the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. This booklet is about the Social Security disability program.
For Information about the SSI disability program for adults, see Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
(Publication No. 05-11000). For information about disability programs for children, refer to Benefits For
Children With Disabilities (Publication No. 05-10026). Our publications are available at Get A Publication.

How to order

Who can get Social Security disability benefits?

isJ~

Social Security pays benefits to people who cannot work because they have a medical condition that
expected to last at least one year or result In death. Federal law requires this very strict definition of
disability. While some programs give money to people with partial disability or short-term disability, Social
Security does not

7r"

Certain family membens of disabled workens also can receive money from Social Security. This is
explained in "Can my family get benefits?"
How Do I Meet The Earnings Requirement For Disability Benefits?
In general, to get disability benefits, you must meet two different eamings tests:
1. A 'recent work" test basad on your age at the time you became disabled; and
2. A "duration of work' test to show that you worked long enough under Social Security.
Certain blind workers have to meet only the 'duration of work' test
The table below, shows the rules for how much work you need for the "recent work' test based on your age
when your disability began. The rules in this table are based on the calendar quarter in which you tumed
orwlll tum a certain age.
The calendar quartens are:
Irst Quarter: January 1 through March 31
econd Quarter: April 1 through June 30
hlrd Quarter: July 1 through September 30; and
ourth Quarter: October 1 through December 31
Rules for work needed for the "recent work test"
orne
disabled ...

Then you generally need:

In or before the quarter
you tum age 24

1.5 yeans of work during the three-year period ending with the quarter your
disability began.
Work during half the time for the period beginning with the quarter after you
In the quarter after you
tumed 21 and ending with the quarter you became disabled. Example: If you
tum age 24 but before the become disabled in the quarter you tumed age 27, then you would need three
quarter you tum age 31 years of work out of the six-year period ending with the quarter you became
disabled.
In the quarter you tum
Work during five yeans out of the 10-year period ending with the quarter your
age 31 or later
disability began.

b

Idaho Workers' Compensation Benefits Table

AVERAGE STATE WAGE (ASW)

55% ASW (PPI)
MINIMUM 45% ASW
(unless over 90% AWW)
45% INCREASE
60%ASW
-Increase from Last Year
67%ASW
- Increase from Last Year
90% ASW MAXIMUM
-Increase from Last Year
15% ASW MINIMUM*
-Increase from Last Year

1999
456.00
250.80

2000
471.00
259.05

2001
495.00
272.25

2002
526.00
289.30

2003
527.00
289.85

2004
534.00
293.70

2005
543.00
298.65

2006
565.00
310.75

2007
584.00
321.20

2008
618.00
339.90

2009
636.00
349.80

2010
643.00
353.65

2011
646.00
355.30

2012
661.00
363.55

205.20
5.85
273.60
7.80
305.52
8.71
410.40
11.70
68.40
1.95

211.95
6.75
282.60
9.00
315.57
10.05
423.90
13.50
70.65
2.25

222.75
10.80
297.00
14.40
331.65
16.08
445.50
21.60
74.25
3.60

236.70
13.95
315.60
18.60
352.42
20.77
473.40
27.90
78.90
4.65

237.15
0.45
316.20
0.60
353.09
0.67
474.30
0.90
79.05
0.15

240.30
3.15
320.40
4.20
357.78
4.69
480.60
6.30
80.10
1.05

244.35
4.05
325.80
5.40
363.81
6.03
488.70
8.10
81.45
1.35

254.25
9.90
339.00
13.20
378.55
14.74
508.50
19.80
84.75
3.30

262.80
8.55
350.40
11.40
391.28
12.73
525.60
17.10
87.60
2.85

278.10
15.30
370.80
20.40
414.06
22.78
556.20
30.60
92.70
5.10

286.20
8.10
381.60
10.80
426.12
12.06
572.40
16.20
95.40
2.70

289.35
3.15
385.80
4.20
430.81
4.69
578.70
6.30
96.45
1.05

290.70
1.35
387.60
1.80
432.82
2.01
581.40
2.70
96.90
0.45

297.45
6.75
396.60
9.00
442.87
10.05
594.90
13.50
99.15
2.25

----------

AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE (AWW)
.142857 - 1 day
.285714 - 2 dys

rn

.428571-3 days
.571428-4 days

.714285-5 days
.857142~ days

To determine weekly wage for monthly salary:
.23077 x monthly wage =weekly wage
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Actuarial Life Table
Office of the Chief Actuary
life Tables

A period life table is based on the mortality experience of a population during a relatively short period
oftime. Here we present the 2007 period life table for the Social Security area population. For this
table, the period life expectancy at a given age represents the average number of years of life
remaining if a group of persons at that age were to experience the mortality rates for 2007 over the
course of their remaining life.
Period Life Table , 2007
Male

Exact
age

Female

Death
probability •

Number of
lives b

Life
expectancy

Death
probability •

Number of
lives b

0

0.007379

100,000

75.38

0.006096

100,000

80.43

1

0.000494

99,262

74.94

0.000434

99,390

79.92

Life
expectancy

2

0.000317

99,213

73.98

0.000256

99,347

78.95

3

0.000241

99,182

73.00

0.000192

99,322

77.97

4

0.000200

99,158

72.02

0.000148

99,303

76.99
76.00

5

0.000179

99,138

71.03

0.000136

99,288

6

0.000166

99,120

70.04

0.000128

99,275

75.01

7

0.000152

99,104

69.05

0.000122

99,262

74.02

8

0.000133

99,089

68.06

0.000115

99,250

73.03

9

0.000108

99,075

67.07

0.000106

99,238

72.04

10

0.000089

99,065

66.08

0.000100

99,228

71.04

11

0.000094

99,056

65.09

0.000102

99,218

70.05

12

0.000145

99,047

64.09

0.000120

99,208

69.06

13

0.000252

99,032

63.10

0.000157

99,196

68.07
67.08

14

0.000401

99,007

62.12

0.000209

99,180

15

0.000563

98,968

61.14

0.000267

99,160

66.09

16

0.000719

98,912

60.18

0.000323

99,133

65.11

17

0.000873

98,841

59.22

0.000369

99,101

64.13

18

0.001017

98,754

58.27

0.000401

99,064

63.15

19

0.001148

98,654

57.33

0.000422

99,025

62.18

20

0.001285

98,541

56.40

0.000441

98,983

61.20

21

0.001412

98,414

55.47

0.000463

98,939

60.23

22

0.001493

98,275

54.54

0.000483

98,894

59.26

23

0.001513

98,128

53.63

0.000499

98,846

58.29

24

0.001487

97,980

52.71

0.000513

98,796

57.32

25

0.001446

97,834

51.78

0.000528

98,746

56.35

26

0.001412

97,693

50.86

0.000544

98,694

55.38

27

0.001389

97,555

49.93

0.000563

98,640

54.40

28

0.001388

97,419

49.00

0.000585

98,584

53.44

29

0.001405

97,284

48.07

0.000612

98,527

52.47

30

0.001428

97,147

47.13

0.000642

98,466

51.50

31

0.001453

97,009

46.20

0.000678

98,403

50.53

32

0.001487

96,868

45.27

0.000721

98,336

49.56

33

0.001529

96,724

44.33

0.000771

98,266

48.60

34

0.001584

96,576

43.40

0.000830

98,190

47.64

o
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Female

Male
Exact
age
35

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Death
probability •
0.001651

Number of
lives b
96,423

Life
expectancy
42.47

Death
probability •
0.000896

0.001737
0.001845
0.001979
0.002140
0.002323
0.002526
0.002750
0.002993
0.003257
0.003543
0.003856
0.004208
0.004603

96,264
96,096
95,919
95,729
95,525
95,303
95,062
94,800
94,517
94,209
93,875
93,513
93,120
92,691
92,224

41.54
40.61
39.68
38.76
37.84
36.93
36.02
35.12
34.22
33.33
32.45
31.57
30.71
29.84

0.000971
0.001056
0.001153
0.001260
0.001377
0.001506
0.001650
0.001810
0;001985
0.002174
0.002375
0.002582
0.002794
0.003012

28.99

91,716

28.15
27.32

0.005037
0.005512
0.006008
0.006500

53
54

0.006977
0.007456

55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

0.007975
0.008551
0.009174
0.009848
0.010584
0.011407
0.012315
0.013289
0.014326
0.015453
0.Q16723

91,165
90,572
89,940
89,270

26.49
25.68
24.87

Number of
lives b
98,108
98,020

Life
expectancy
46.68

97,925
97,822
97,709
97,586
97,452
97,305
97,144
96,968
96,776
96,566
96,336
96,087
95,819

45.72
44.76
43.81
42.86
41.91
40.97
40.03
39.10
38.17
37.24
36.32
35.41
34.50
33.59

0.003255

95,530

32.69

0.003517
0.003782
0.004045

95,219
94,885
94,526

31.80
30.91
30.02

94,143
93,737

84,427
83,236
81,944
80,537
79,008
77,355
75,580
73,679
71,638
69,441
67,090

29.14
28.27
27.40
26.53
25.67
24.82
23.97
23.14
22.31
21.49
20.69
19.89
19.10
18.32
17.55
16.79
16.05
15.32
14.61
13.91
13.22
12.55
11.90
11.26
10.63

64,587

10.03

68,254
66,161
63,947
61,612
59,147
56,545

14.40
13.73
13.08
12.44
11.82
11.21
10.62
10.04
9.48

0.053140

53,811

8.94

0.004318
0.004619
0.004965
0.005366
0.005830
0.006358
0.006961
0.007624
0.008322
0.009046
0.009822
0.010698
0.011702
0.012832
0.014103
0.015526
0.017163
0.018987
0.020922
0.022951
0.025147
0.027709
0.030659
0.033861
0.037311

79

0.058434

50,951

8.41

0.041132

80

0.064457

47,974

7.90

0.045561

61,930

9.43

81

0.071259

44,882

7.41

0.050698

59,109

8.86

82

0.078741

41,683

6.94

0.056486

56,112

8.31

68
69
70
71

0.018154
0.019732

72
73
74
75
76
77

0.021468
0.023387
0.025579
0.028032
0.030665
0.033467
0.036519
0.040010
0.043987
0.048359

78

88,558
87,800
86,995
86,138
85,227
84,254
83,217
82,111
80,935
79,684
78,351
76,929
75,411
73,792
72,066
70,223

24.06
23.26
22.48
21.69
20.92
20.16
19.40
18.66
17.92
17.19
16.48
15.77
15.08

93,304
92,841
92,342
91,804
91,220
90,585
89,895
89,147
88,340
87,473
86,537
85,524

RULE 3.
PLEADINGS

A.

B.

Complaint and Answer.

1.

. For purposes of these rules, an "application for hearing" as referenced in Idaho
Code § 72-706 shall be called a complaint. The complaint shall be in the form
prescribed by the Commission, a sample of which is attached hereto as Appendix
1. A complaint delivered by facsiInile transmission (fax) to the Commission
before midnight Mountain Time shall be considered filed on that date.

2.

The answer to such complaint shall be in the form prescribed by the Commission,
a sample of which is attached hereto as Appendix 3.

Separate Complaints.
1.

C.

Consolidation - A separate complaint shall be filed for each alleged accident or
occupational disease for which workers' compensation benefits are claimed.
Separate pleadings shall be filed in each case in which a complaint has been filed;
pr9vided, however,· that a single pleading may be filed in two or more cases which
have been consolidated. No cases shall be consolidated except by order of the
Commission, and the Commission will not consider consolidation of cases unless
a separate complaint has been filed in each and every case sought to be
consolidated.

Industrial Special Indemnity Fund.

Any claim against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) shall be made by filing a
separate complaint in accordance with Idaho Code, § 72-334 and shall be in the fonn prescribed
by the Commission, a sarnple·ofwhich is attached hereto as Appendix 2. All complaints against
.the ISIF shall be filed with the Commission and a copy slla,ll be served on all other parties.
D.

Certifyin~

Pleadings, Motions or Other Papers.

Every pleading, motion, and other paper. of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one licensed attorney of record of the State of Idaho, in the attorney's
individual name. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign the pleading, motion,
or otherpaper. The signature of any party to an action, or the party'§ attorney, shall constitute a
certification that said party, or the party's attorney, has read the pleading, motion, or other paper;
that to the best of his or her knowledge, infonnation and belief after reasonable inquiry there are
sufficient grounds to support it; and that it is not submitted for delay or any other improper
purpose.
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E.

F.

Motions Generally.
1.

An application to the Commission for an order shall be made by filing a motion .
which, unless made during a hearing, shall be made in writing, state the legal and
factual basis for the motion, and set forth the relief or order sought.

2.

If after 14 days from the filing of a motion, no brief, affidavit, or other response is
filed, the Commission may act on the motion. The Commission may act on the
motion sooner after giving actUal notice, or attempting to give actual notice by
telephone or by facsimile transmission, to all parties. If the motion is opposed by
any party, the Commission may base its ruling on written argument or may
conduct such .conference or hearing as may be necessary, in the Commission's
judgment, to rule on the motion.

3.

All motions and other pleadings shall be served on any other party.

Motions to Reconsider.

A motion to reconsider pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718 shall be made! within 20 days
from the date the final decision is filed and shall be supported by· a brief filed with the motion.
All responses toa motion to reconsider shall be filed within 14 days of the date of filing of the
motion. Any reply brief shall be filed no later than 10 days from the date of filing the response.

G.

Form and Size Requirements for Filed Documents.

All pleadings, letters, petitions, briefs, notices and other documents filed with the
Commission shall be on 8 1/2" xII" paper.

COMMENT: Subse.ctionE•.2. .A .re.sponse to a mo.tion now .allows .14 days instead.of 10 to accommodate
delivery and review .ofthe material before preparation ofa responsive filing.
COMMENT BE: Complaint - The necessity to sign the release by claimant is not jurisdictional to filing
the complaint. The use of this form is intended for ease in receiving medical information by
Employer/Surety. Should claimant refuse to release such medical information, serious consequences may
.
develop in continuing the claim for benefits.

1 Amended

March 1, 2008
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